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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARK ERICKSON,
' in in ill' f 1

1 ippellee,
Case Ho. 930252-CA

RONALD K. PLATTS, d/b/a
E-Z STREET AUTO,

Priority No. 106'

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The defendant appeals from a final Judgment and Order entered
on April
3(a), U.R.A.P. The plaintiff alleged fraud in connection with the
mileage disclosure on a used car transaction.
counterclaimed for the unpaid balance due uiidei Uie

The defendant
\ i"il i ,h'l.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the Trial Court correctly construe the provisions of 15
U.S.C. 1988 (federal odometer statute)

rindxn

5

dealer disclosure form provided notice to buyer that the actual
m i I vi.Jift,11 i i" I!!1, unknown rather than disclosing odometer reading in
excess of mechanical limits?
The Trial Court's interpretation of the statute poses a
quests

correctness State v. Warner, 788 P.

2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2. Did the Lower Court erroneously fail to require proof of
fraud and misrepresei

vi ncing evidence?

The essential elements of Fraudulent Misrepresentation must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
River Motel, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 29

P 2d

Shuhman v. Green
(Utah Ct. App.

1992); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P 2d 273 (1952).
The Trial Court erroneously awarded rescission where the
plaintiff had failed to make an election to rescind or sue for
damages. See Election: Rescission or Damages, 40 A.L.R. 4th, 627.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES. PROVISIONS, AND RULES
Any relevant text or Constitutional, Statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff filed this action January 10, 1990, alleging
fraud in connection with the purchase of a 1980 Volkswagen Camper
Van from defendant, a licensed used car dealer (R.l-7). On January
18, 1990, defendant filed a Verified Answer denying the allegation
of fraud, and seeking damages for breach of the contract of sale
and for the balance due the defendant because the plaintiff had
stopped payment on the credit cards he used to purchase the
vehicle. (R. 8-18).
The case was tried to the Court commencing September 29,
1992.

Judge Griffiths rendered a Memorandum Decision November 24,

1992 (R. 85-88).

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and an

Order were signed on February 1, 1993 (R.92-98) (R. 99-100).
Plaintiff was awarded a judgment for $1,212.80 plus interest, Court
costs of $104.00 and attorney fees of $1500.00.
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Defendant filed a Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment, or
for a New Trial. The Motion was argued to the Court, and denied in
and Order dated April 1, 1993. It is from the adverse Judgment and
Order that the defendant filed this appeal on April 16, 1993.
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Order of the lower Court, or, in
the alternative, for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this action, the Court was called upon to construe the
mileage disclosure requirements as the apply to an odometer which
has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles.

The testimony

presented at the trial was convoluted and each party challenged the
other's accuracy as to what occurred.

Upon consideration of all

the evidence, the Court found for the plaintiff. A copy of the
Court's Memorandum Decision is included in the addendum.
In September, 1989, E-Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980
Volkswagen Camper Van for sale.

The record is not clear when

defendant acquired this vehicle for sale, but the facts establish
that defendant

had

it

inspected

on January

25, 1989.

The

inspection certificate indicates that the owner is E-Z Auto Sales
and the mileage was 46,811 miles.

An affidavit filed with the

Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the previous
owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to
defendant, indicates that the actual mileage was 146,811 miles.
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased
the Camper Van from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to
the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven the vehicle. Paul Lives,
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a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive.
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short
distance from defendant's lot. Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law
inspected the vehicle.

At this time, the odometer showed the

mileage to be around 48,800 miles.

Even though the vehicle was

relatively old# with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the
condition of the body, the three felt that

it was in good

mechanical condition*
Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the
odometer. Plaintiff remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown
were the actual miles.
differently.

Mr. Lives remembers the conversation

He testified that he told plaintiff to have the

vehicle checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine
the actual mileage on a car that old. During the week plaintiff
talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of defendant.
The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle.
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations
for defendant.

Both Federal and State law require that the seller

state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of ownership.

The

Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this
information.

Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents

of sale.

On the Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the

odometer

reading,

Mr.

Memmott

wrote

48,831.

The

Odometer

Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states that "the
odometer now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my
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knowledge

that

it

reflects

the

actual

mileage

of

the

vehicle...unless one of the following statements is checked:
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the
odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in
excess of its mechanical limits.
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the
actual mileage. WARNING—ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.
Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he
misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though
he knew that the actual mileage was not 48,831 miles.

When

statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was
an odometer discrepancy.

Both plaintiff and his wife testified

that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the
odometer, was the actual miles of the vehicle.
Plaintiff alleged that he had expended money for repairs on
his vehicle, and rental of a truck to tow the vehicle back from
Nevada after it had broken down a week after the purchase.

The

Trial Court accepted these items in arriving at damages, in
addition to allowing a rescission of the contract. (R. 86).
Defendant's evidence was that no fraud had occurred and that
no misrepresentation of material fact was made to plaintiffs
concerning the mileage. Defendant's exhibits included the Vehicle
Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement (R. 57), the Motor Vehicle
sold As Is without any warranty form, signed by plaintiff, (R. 59),
Odometer Statement from Robyn Duncan, showing mileage unknown (R.
60), the Odometer Statement signed by plaintiff, indicating mileage
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unknown,

(R.

62), documents

evidencing

the

stop

payment

by

plaintiff on his credit card (R. 64), and documents prepared in
connection with the repossession for the vehicle, several months
after the transaction(R. 52-55).
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the defendant's
salesmen had told the plaintiff that the mileage was 100,000 less
than actual.

The vehicle had an odometer that only recorded

mileage to 99,999 miles. The usual practice in Utah is to fill in
the blank for odometer reading exactly as shown by the odometer
itself. Further, the practice is to execute the federal disclosure
form to conform with the information acquired from the prior owner,
which, in this case was, mileage unknown.

Thus, the disclosure

form will indicate either actual miles, or actual miles in excess
of mechanical capacity of the odometer (odometer rollover), or the
fact

of

an

odometer

discrepancy

(mileage

unknown—odometer

discrepancy). In this case the plaintiff was provided the federal
odometer disclosure form, with box 2 marked mileage unknown, and he
signed the Odometer Disclosure form indicating that he had received
a copy of the form and that the disclosures were made thereon.
Defendant's evidence contained documents signed by plaintiff
wherein it was specifically set forth that the plaintiff had
purchased the vehicle "as is," and that there were no warranties
express or implied.

The usual practice is that when an automobile

is purchased, that the new owner thereafter becomes responsible for
its maintenance and repair.

Prior to the purchase the plaintiff

had

by his father-in-law,

the vehicle

inspected
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who was an

experienced

Volkswagen

mechanic.

The

plaintiff

had

every

opportunity to check out the mechanical condition of the vehicle
prior to the purchase.

Even after the vehicle had broken down in

Nevada, plaintiff had taken the vehicle to his father-in-law, who
was in the process of overhauling the motor.

The motor was in a

state of disassembly at the time when it was repossessed by
defendant, after the parties were unable to agree on a settlement.
The defendant and his salesmen denied any false or misleading
statements regarding mileage, and presented documents which conform
to the reguirements of the odometer disclosure statute.

The

defense evidence was that no representation was made by anyone to
the plaintiff, orally or in writing, that would lead him to believe
that the vehicle had 48,000 actual miles.

They affirmatively

indicated that the odometer disclosure form specifically put
plaintiff on notice that the miles were not actual.

Further, the

vehicle was nearly 10 years old, and defendant's position was that
no

reasonable

person, not

even

this

plaintiff, would

have

reasonably relied on the mileage on the odometer as being actual.

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
Argument I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE PROVISIONS OF 15
U.S.C. SEC. 1981-1991 (FEDERAL ODOMETER STATUTE) IN FINDING FOR
PLAINTIFF WHERE DEFENDANT HAD COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS ADVISED THAT THE
MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN.
The Trial Court erroneously construed the provisions of 15
U.S.C. Sec* 1981-1991 (Federal Odometer Statute). The Trial judge
erred in applying the federal odometer statute to this case.
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The

Court's conclusion that defendant salesman should have checked box
1 and not box 2 is an incorrect interpretation of the statute. The
defendant complied fully with the federal odometer statute, and was
required to show mileage unknown.

The error of the lower court

requires reversal of the case.
Argument II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
The Court erred in failing to require proof by clear and
convincing evidence of plaintiff's common law claims under state
law.

The plaintiff had never filed any pleadings claiming relief

pursuant to the federal odometer statute.

The judgment for

rescission and damages are not supported by competent admissible
evidence.
evidence

The Court erred in not requiring clear and convincing
standard,

which

requires

reversal

of

the

case.

ARGUMENT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE PROVISIONS OF 15
U.S.C. SEC. 1981-1991 (FEDERAL ODOMETER STATUTE) IN FINDING FOR
PLAINTIFF WHERE DEFENDANT HAD COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS ADVISED THAT THE
MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN.
Defendant fully complied with the requirements of the odometer
statute by delivering to the plaintiff a completed Odometer Mileage
Statement accurately stating that the actual mileage was unknown as
of the date of the transaction.

The plaintiff signed the form,

indicating that he had received the disclosure, and that there was
an odometer discrepancy.
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In Francesconi v. Kardon Chevrolet, Inc., 888 F.2d 18 (3rd
Cir. 1989) the Court of Appeals held that a car salesman's
inaccurate oral representations as to number of miles traveled were
not actionable under the odometer act where the written disclosure
form accurately reports the correct number of miles, and where the
disclosure form is presented to the transferee at the time of the
mileage, if known- (at p. 20)
In the instant case, the Court erred in concluding that the
defendant's salesman had misled the plaintiff by indicating in
writing that the odometer was not to be relied upon, and that he
should have informed the plaintiff that the mileage was in excess
of 100,000 miles.

Here, the vehicle had been taken in from the

prior owner with the statement "mileage unknown".

The salesman

therefore, honestly could not state that the mileage was actual,
subject to having exceeded the mechanical limits of the odometer
instrument, and acordingly disclosed the mileage as "unknown."
The principal objective of the federal odometer statute is the
detect

"rollbacksM

of

odometers.

The

statute

provides

for

statutory "actual damages" for an odometer roll-back violation as
the difference between the amount paid for the car and its fair
and its fair market value at the time of sale. In Beachv v. Eagle
Motors. Inc. » 637 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ind. 1986) the Court held
that the buyers are not entitled to recover as actual damages
repairs which were not shown to have been occasioned by alleged
misrepresentations inherent in a rollback.
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Thus, the Lower Court

was in error in using this statute to rule that the plaintiff was
entitled to rescission and damages, plus attorney fees.
Plaintiff presented no evidence to establish that the actual
fair market price for the vehicle would have been any different
than the actual purchase price.

The amount he spent to rent a

large truck was not a direct consequence of an odometer disclosure
violation. The repairs he made were relatively minor, and were of
the type to be included within the usual meaning of an was-is,f
purchase.

The ultimate failure of the motor in the desert of

Nevada was more likely due to the neglect and abuse of the vehicle
by the plaintiff, than from any odometer disclosure violation.
The prevailing federal case is that if a transferor of a
vehicle has actual or constructive knowledge that the odometer
reading is incorrect, he has a duty to disclose that the actual
mileage is unknown. Nieto v. Pencer 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1978).
That Court construed the concept of a "knowing" violation, and
concluded that the dealer has an affirmative duty to mark the 'true
mileage unknown91 where he would have reason to know the mileage was
more

that recorded by the odometer or based upon the statement of

the prior owner.
That rule was followed in Utah in ChqrnetgKv Vt Gus Paulog
Chevrolet. Inc.. 754 F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah, 1991), with the Court
quoting with approval from the NietorsupraP case.

See also Jones

Vt FeirtQTl Ford, IllSt, 427 F. Supp. 1328 (1977); Duval v. Midwest
Auto Citv, Inc., 578 F. 2d 721 (1978). These cases establish that
the ultimate disclosure is the mileage unknown disclosure, and that
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by making this disclosure according to the statute, the buyer
thereby put on notice that the odometer is not to be relied upon.
See Auto Sport Motors, v. Bruno Auto Dealers, 721 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y., 1989)
The defendant provided the plaintiff in this case full legal
notice pursuant to the federal odometer statute.
did not claim that the miles were actual.

The defendants

The evidence was

disputed as to whether the plaintiff was informed that the odometer
had rolled over. However, this is irrelevant in light of the more
inclusive disclosure that the miles were unknown. Judge Griffiths
erroneously concluded that the law required this defendant to check
box 1, mileage in excess of mechanical limits.

ARSPMENT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT FOR RESCISSION AND
DAMAGES ON PLAINTIFF'S COMMON LAW FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
The plaintiff failed to prove his case by clear and convincing
evidence.
P. 2d

In Shvthman Vt Creen RiV9r MPtel 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 29,
, (Utah Ct.App. 1992), this Court, citing Pace v.

Parrish. 122 Utah 144, 247 P 2d 273 (1952) reaffirmed that the
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are:
(1) that a misrepresentation was made;
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
11

(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his injury and damage, Accord Wright v. Westside
Nursery. 787 P 2d 508 (Utah App. 1990).
In Deboy v. Vallev Mortgage Co.. 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 35,
2d

P.

(Utah Ct. App 1992) at p. 39, the Court considered claims of

fraud and misrepresentation, and in particular, whether there was
a "fraud by concealment.w

Fraud, "comprises all acts, omissions

and concealments involving a breach of legal or eguitable duty and
resulting damage to another." Schwartz v. Tanner. 576 P 2d 873
(Utah, 1978).
The

question

of

"whether

a

duty

to

speak

exists

is

determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case."
Elder v. Clawson. 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P 2d 802 (1963).

A duty to

speak will not be found where the parties deal at arm's length, and
where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of
both parties.

Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged

to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his own
interests. Sugarhouse Fin, v. Anderson. 610 P 2d 1369 (Utah 1980)
23 Am Jur 856, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment, Sec. 78.
In AtKJlngQn V. IHC »QgpjtaJ.g, In? tr 138 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
2d

P.

(Utah Sup. Ct. 1990) the Supreme Court found no fraud in the

settlement of a personal injury case where the plaintiffs had been
fully informed of the medical facts. Neither did it find negligent
misrepresentation.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 552

(1977).
In the instant case, the Trial Court specifically did not find
that the defendant had misrepresented the miles as actual, but that
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he had a duty to disclose the fact that the mileage was in excess
of the mechanical limits* But where the disclosure further advised
plaintiff that mileage was unknown, the plaintiff was not misled by
the mileage of the vehicle.

Therefore, there was no duty to

disclose in any event.
The law is clear that to recover in fraud, a plaintiff must
establish the element of reliance which is justifiable under the
circumstances. In Cender v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P. 2d
634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) § p. 638, the Court discusses the public
policy considerations, and cites Prosser and Keeton, The Law of
Torts, Sec. 108, at 749-50 (5th Ed. 1984);
If plaintiff can claim reliance on the basis
of the kind of statement on which no
reasonable person would rely for one reason or
another, then it is quite likely that
plaintiff did not rely and if his testimony
that he did is allowed as sufficient evidence
on the basis of which a finder of fact can
find reliance, then it will be too easy for a
party to a contract to escape the consequences
of his own bad judgment in making a bargain of
some kind.
Further, the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages.
A plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for any harm he
could have reasonably avoided by the use of reasonable effort after
the commission of a tort.
cited therein.

See Cenderf supraf at p. 634 and cases

Any delay on the part of the defrauded party may

constitute a waiver of the right to rescind the contract. Duaan v.
Jones, 615 P 2d 1239 (Utah, 1980); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P 2d 304
(Utah, 1979)
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The Trial Court erroneously allowed plaintiff to rescind the
contract, notwithstanding the fact that between August and December
he had failed to deliver the vehicle back to the dealer.

He had

concealed it with his father-in-law. Even though he failed to pay,
he kept the vehicle concealed from the dealer.

When the van was

repossessed for nonpayment, the dealer found that the motor had
been

completely

disassembled.

These

actions

constitute

unreasonably delay, and are inconsistent with seeking the remedy of
rescission.
Further, the out of pocket damages claimed by plaintiff were
not of the type that would arise from any alleged misrepresentation
as to the mileage of the machine.

Plaintiff believed that it was

in good mechanical condition when he bought it.

There was no

evidence that the purchase price was not the actual fair market
value for a van of that vintage. The mechanical failure was caused
by the actions of the plaintiff, not through any misrepresentation
on the part of the dealer.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Trial Court is in error and should be
reversed, or a new trial ordered.
DATED this K dav of April, 1994.

D. Russell
Attorney for Appellant
JQIJII
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant/Defendant Ronald K. Platts were served upon
counsel for Plaintiff by delivering said copy, postage prepaid, to:

James C. Haskins
5085 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107
this Jl_day of April, 1994.
"—>*
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Third Judicial Circuit Court Of Salt Lake County

Murray Department, State of Utah

MARK ERICKSON,

j
Plaintiff,

vs.

|
|

E Z STREET AUTO SALES,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 903000298

|

Defendant.
In this action, the court is called upon to construe the mileage disclosure requirements
as they apply to an odometer which has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles. The
testimony presented at the trial is convoluted and each party challenges the others accuracy as
to what occurred. Upon consideration of all the evidence, the court finds for the plaintiff as
hereinafter set forth.
September, 1989, defendant, E Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980 Volkswagen
Camper Van for sale. The record is not clear when defendant acquired this vehicle for sale,
but the facts establish that defendant had it inspected on January 25, 1989. The inspection
certificate indicates that the owner is E Z Street Auto Sales and the mileage was 46,811
miles. An affidavit filed with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the
previous owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to defendant, indicates
that the actual odometer reading was 146,811 miles.
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased the Camper Van
from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven
the vehicle. Paul Lives, a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive.
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short distance from defendant's
lot. Plaintiffs wife and father-in-law inspected the vehicle. At this time, the odometer
showed the mileage to be around 48,800 miles. Even though the vehicle was relatively old,
with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that
it was in good mechanical condition.
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Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the odometer. Plaintiff
remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives
remembers the conversation differently. He testified that he told plaintiff to have the vehicle
checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car that
old. During the week plaintiff talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of
defendant. The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle. Mr. Memmott never
told plaintiff what the actual mileage was.
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations for defendant. Both
Federal and State law require that the seller state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of
ownership. The Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this
information. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents of sale. On the
Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the odometer reading, Mr. Memmott wrote
48,831. The Odometer Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states the
odometer "now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my knowledge
that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle....unless one of the following statements is
checked.
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits.
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage.
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he misrepresented the
mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though he knew that the actual mileage was not
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was an
odometer discrepancy. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told them that
the 48,831 miles, as shown on the odometer, were the actual miles of the vehicle.
Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00
for an out of state permit). Plaintiff paid for the purchase by using two credit cards by
charging $3,000.00 on one card and $1,291.00 on the second. Plaintiff bought the vehicle
"as is" and signed statements that he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties.
Plaintiff drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming. During the first week
of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. At the beginning of the second week, plaintiff,
his wife, and one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles, California. The
car broke down about 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada. It was towed to Las Vegas.
Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul.
That the cost of such an overhaul would be in the neighborhood of $2,000.00. He was also
told that from the condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly
in excess of the mileage figure shown on the odometer.
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So as not to ruin their vacation trip to California, plaintiff rented a car in Las Vegas
and continued on to Los Angeles. On their return trip, plaintiff rented a truck large enough
to tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South Salt Lake,
Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to rent the truck. The father-in-law, who
is an experienced Volkswagen mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to
repair it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he determined that a
complete engine overhaul was necessary.
Plaintiff was able to discover the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold it, was 146,811 miles.
Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant
insisted that under it's "as-is, no warranty11 contract it had no legal obligation to repair the
engine. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty'1
if he had known the mileage was over 100,000 miles. It is plaintiffs contention that Mr.
Memmott knew or should have known that the correct mileage was 148,831 miles. That
defendant committed fraud when both its salesman and manager misrepresented the actual
mileage of the vehicle. That by putting the odometer reading of 48,831 miles on the
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement, defendant violated the Federal
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991 (federal
odometer statute).
The U. S. Congress in § 1981 stated its findings that purchasers, when buying
motor vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value
of such vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate indication of the
mileage traveled by a motor vehicle assists the purchaser in determining its safety and
reliability. In actions brought under this act, courts have enforced strict accountability on
any person transferring ownership of a vehicle. The standard of proof in actions based on
fraud is the preponderance of evidence standard. The "intent to defraud" required for a
violation includes action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action taken with the
specific intent to deceive or cheat potential purchasers. See Ryan vs. Edwards. 592 F 2d 756
(1979V. Havnes vs. Manning, 917 F2d 450 (1990^.
In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the odometer of a used car is a factor
which is likely to affect the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State v.
Forshee. 588 P.2d 181. Plaintiff testified that he would have made a different deal, or no
deal at all, had he known the actual mileage of the vehicle.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether defendant's salesman and manager
told the plaintiff that the mileage of the vehicle was 100,00 miles less than the actual
mileage. However, the court finds that from January, 1989, defendant's agents knew or
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should have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that the actual mileage was
100,000 miles more than as shown on the odometer. This information was not given to the
plaintiff. Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual mileage
on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement.
"...when a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after
registering 99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy
the requirements of [the Act] is the total of 100,000 plus the number actually
appearing on the odometer." Ryan v. Edwards. 592 P2d 760.
What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to the actual mileage. Such conduct
mislead the plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to
defraud.
The court finds that defendant, through the actions of its agents, committed fraud on
the plaintiff. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant as follows: (1) The Purchase
Agreement is rescinded. Plaintiffs obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, is
cancelled. (2) Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from December 1, 1989, and his court costs. (3) Since the provisions of the Federal
Act also apply to state actions (see § 1989), plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees.
(4) No punitive damages are awarded.
Dated this

'Zyj-L

day of November, 1992.

L. H Grimms, Circuit Judge

fg*

James C. Haskins (1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 268-3994
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SALT LkKE' 'COUNTY
MURRAY DEPARTMENT

MARK ERICKSON,
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 903000298

E.Z. STREET AUTO,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department.
The plaintiff, Mark Erickson, appeared in person and through
his attorney, James C. Haskins and Jeff Hollingworth.

The

defendant, E.Z. Street Auto, appeared in person and through its
attorney, John D. Russell.

Evidence was produced by each of the

parties through testimony and exhibits.

At the conclusion of the

presentation of testimony and exhibits, both parties rested.

The

court having heard all the evidence and being fully advised in
the premises now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of
law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In September 1989, Defendant E.Z. Street Auto offered a

H

1980 Volkswagen camper van ("Vehicle") for sale.
2.

On or about September 26, 1989, Plaintiff purchased the

Vehicle from Defendant.
3.

Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of

$4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 for an out of state permit).
Plaintiff paid for the Vehicle's purchase using two credit cards.
Plaintiff charged $1,291.00 on his American Express card and
$3,000.00 on his Visa card.
4.

Approximately one week prior to purchasing the Vehicle,

Plaintiff test drove the Vehicle accompanied by one of
Defendant's salesman, Paul Lives.
5.

While on the test drive, Plaintiff stopped at his

father-in-law's home and Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law
inspected the Vehicle.

At this time the odometer indicated that

the mileage on the Vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles.
6.

Even though the Vehicle was relatively old, given the

low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body,
the three felt that the Vehicle was in good condition.
7.

Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage shown on

the odometer.

Plaintiff testified that Mr. Lives told Plaintiff

that the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives testified
that he told Plaintiff to have the Vehicle checked by a mechanic
because there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car
that old.
8.

During the week prior to the Vehicle's purchase,

Plaintiff spoke with Defendant's manager, Ronald Meramott,
2
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regarding purchase terms.

Both plaintiff and his wife testified

that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the
Vehicle's odometer, were the actual miles of the Vehicle.
9.

On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of

Defendant, finalized the Vehicle's purchase with Plaintiff.
10.

Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents

transferring ownership of the Vehicle to Plaintiff.
11.

Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase Agreement on which he

indicated the Vehicle's mileage as 48,831.
12.

Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement

which stated in pertinent part:
I E.Z. Street Auto state that the odometer . . . now
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the
Vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is
checked.
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge
the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in
excess of its mechanical limits.
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT
the actual mileage. WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.
13.

Mr. Memmott checked statement (2) and at trial denied

that he misrepresented the mileage of the Vehicle to Plaintiff,
even though he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of
48,831 miles.

When statement (2) was checked, people were put on

notice that there was an odometer discrepancy.
14.

Plaintiff bought the Vehicle "as is" and signed

statements that he realized the Vehicle was sold without any
warranties.
15.

Plaintiff drove the Vehicle to his home in Evanston,

Wyoming and during the first week of operation he repaired the
3
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brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24.
16.

At the beginning of the

second week, Plaintiff, his

wife, and their one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to
Los Angeles, California.
17.

Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the

Vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas.
18.

While in Las Vegas, Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen

repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul at an
estimated cost of $2,000.00. He was also told that from the
condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage
was greatly in excess of the mileage figure shown on the
odometer.
19.

So as not to ruin their trip to California, plaintiff

rented a car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles.
On their return trip, Plaintiff rented a truck large enough to
tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's
home in South Salt Lake, Utah.

It cost $150.34 to rent the car

and $939.22 to rent the truck.
20.

The father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen

mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair
it.

The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he

determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary.
21.

Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair

the engine were unsuccessful.

Defendant insisted that under it's

"as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to
4

repair the engine.
22.

Plaintiff, upon finding an old registration form,

discovered the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van.

They

informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold
it, was 146,811 miles.
23.

Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased

the Vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the mileage was
over 100,000 miles.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The U.S. Congress stated in its findings of the Federal

Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1981-1991 ("Federal Odometer Statute"), that purchasers, when
buying motor Vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an
index of the condition and value of such Vehicle; that purchasers
are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the Vehicle; that
an accurate indication of the mileage traveled by a motor Vehicle
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and reliability.
2.

In actions brought under the Federal Odometer Statute,

courts have enforced strict accountability on any person
transferring ownership of a Vehicle.

The standard of proof in

actions based on violation of the Federal Odometer Statute
include action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action
taken with the specific intent to deceive or cheat potential
purchasers.

See, Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (1979); Havnes v.

Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (1990).
5

3.

In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the

odometer of a used a car is a factor which is likely to affect
the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance.
v. Forshee, 588 P 2d, 181.

State

Plaintiff testified that he would

have made a different deal, or no deal at all, had he known
Vehicle's actual mileage.
4.

There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether

Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff that the
Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than the actual mileage.
However, the court concludes that from January, 1989, Defendant's
agents knew or should have known that the odometer had "turned
over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as
shown on the odometer.
5.

This information was not given to the plaintiff.

Mr.

Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual
mileage on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase
Agreement.
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has
"turned over" after registering 99,999 miles, the
"cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy the
requirements of (the Act) is the total of 100,000 plus the
number actually appearing on the odometer."
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P2d 760.
6.

What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to

the actual mileage.

Such conduct mislead the plaintiff and

constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent
to defraud.
7.

The court concludes that Defendant, through the actions
6
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of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiff should be granted judgment against the

defendant as follows:
(1) The Purchase Agreement should be rescinded.
Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges,
should be cancelled;
(2) Plaintiff should be awarded damages of $1,212.80,
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989, and
his court costs of $104.00;
(3) Since the provisions of the Federal Act also apply
to state actions (see § 1989), Plaintiff should be awarded
$1,500.00 attorney's fees.
(4) No punitive damages should be awarded.

DATED this

day
day of
of <^FQAJ^~a**\
SMA&2Z±

. 1993.

By the Court:

Judge
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James C. Haskins (1406)

FILED

HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street

? '...

Murray, Utah 84107

T H e C I P l o urr

ftr

Telephone: (801) 268-3994
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY
MURRAY DEPARTMENT

MARK ERICKSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
Civil No- 903000298

E.Z. STREET AUTO,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department and the court having made its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant;

2.

The Purchase Agreement is rescinded;

3.

Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card

charges, is cancelled;
4.

Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, plus

interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989 until
paid in full.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded his court costs of $104.00;

n

COURT
mgt^

6.

Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees.

7.

Plaintiff is not awarded any punitive damages.

DATED this

'jsOA

day of ^JBA\AAA*A~IA

1993.

By the Court:

L. H Griffiths/f/circuit Judge
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VEHICLE B p ' R ' S ORDER AND PURCHASE / f "EEMENT

SELLER:

Date

A

E.Z. STREET AUTO

7

"

Purchaser's Name

4100 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

^

/ S t r e e t Address

(801) 268-6322

City

C

County

Slate

7g7

Res Phone

ZipCode

-ffg0 2_

Bus Phone

I/We hereby order from you and agree
purchase from
lyiec to
VJ puiuiioac
iium you
yui subject to all terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on the
reverse side hereof the following vejptyle.
f) _ m
-.

755i - faL.

SALESMANSFRIFS E ' 1 f l > * / l j 7 & ^

B0D

DNEW^USED

l/*M

Y TYPE-

-COLOR

YEAR

Q ^

&OtJb*\*l

MAKE V'VV
.ODOMETER.
DEL.
DATE.

STOCK NO.

V.I.N.
CASH SELLING PRICE
ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS

$

Buver is responsible for all liability.
i n s u r a n t , damage due to collision.

feS'/TfrriL

V l t f e 'C?

USED TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS
MAKE OF TRADE-IN
MILES
YEAR
BODY TYPE
SERIES
V.I.N.

^

BALANCE OF £

'7/<&&~~0hs^ rT~
-y—

(*) yrte^^/

ADDRESS
GOOD
UNTIL:

- _*»

'T^Jry^V

D PURCHASER

VERIFIED
BY:

D SELLER

DATE:

USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE
DEPOSIT
CASH WITH ORDER

^yi^L*—,

Customer guarantees financing has been
/

OWED TO

TO BE PAID BY:

Car sold as is, as equipped, no free work
nromi§ed, no implied warranty

obtained

DDEMO

<*

jC^sJL*^

TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column)
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received
P Trfle (If not, explain*

)
—_-__________--__-_-_____________________________________
D Registration
Q Out-of-State Aff.
D Odometer Statement
D Power of Attorney
• Bill of Sale
D Auth. for Payoff
OTHFR TERMS AfiRFFH TO-

UBS^USBSBBm^

_^_fl^__QWHH_H

_^H_fl-__-H-^-_r
fl_iN^^__H__V
^^^(__H-i-B_W

VEHICLE WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS
SERVICE C O N T R A C T

fl__H____^_^__^__i

*MK

DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE
SUB TOTAL
TRADE ALLOWANCE
TAXABLE AMOUNT
UTAH SALES TAX
LICENSE & REGISTRATION
PROPERTY TAX DUE
DEALER HANDLING FEE
_^

Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms^ndcRiditions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a
true copy of this agreement.

-

4MB
_-_

krf of*srsj9ite &<~rt* T*

^5^°
*

TOTAL OF ABOVE ITEMS
TOTAL CREDITS (Tmwtemdfromrightcolumn)

BALANCE DUE

$

i_
$

Ort^%s^j^~4fc*m
Purchaser'* Signature

^ 7
L

Arj^CDTcn nv' >~a_J

f J

v

*

c

*^xP\_*J

*

\

D

a

t

V\JL^y**^foMr

Dealer or Sales Manager

e

GLs

CONDITIONS
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms and conditions which have been mutually agreed
upon:.
1.

The manufacturer has reserved the right to change the list price of new motor vehicles without notice and in the event that the
list price of the new vehicle purchased hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which is based on list price effective
on the day of delivery, will govern in this transaction. But if such cash delivered price is increased the buyer may. if
dissatisfied with such increased price, cancel this order, in which event if a used vehicle has been traded in as a part of the
consideration herein, such used vehicle shall be returned to the purchaser upon the payment of a reasonable charge for
storage and repairs (if any) or, if the used vehicle has b§en previously sold by the dealer, the amount received therefor, less a
selling commission of 15% and any expense incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning or advertising said vehicle for sale,
shall be returned to the purchaser.

2.

The purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear
excepted, and the buyer warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all lien and encumbrances except as
otherwise noted of the reverse side hereof.

3.

Upon the failure or refusal of the purchaser to complete said purchase for any reason other than cancellation on account of
increase in price, the cash deposit may be retained as liquidated damages, or in the event a used vehicle has been taken in
trade, the purchaser hereby authorizes dealer to sell said used vehicle, and the dealer shall be entitled to reimburse himself
out of the proceeds of such sale, for the expenses specified in paragraph 1 above and also for his expenses and losses
incurred or suffered as the result of purchaser's failure to complete said purchase.

4.

The manufacturer has the right to make any changes in the model or design of any accessories and part of any new motor
vehicle at any time without creating any obligation on the part of either the Dealer or the Manufacturer, to make
corresponding changes in the vehicle covered by this agreement either before or subsequent to the delivery of such vehicle
to the purchaser.

5.

Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond the control
of the dealer.

6.

NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THE
DEALER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED
HEREUNDER, EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE
CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL
BE DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING. BUT NOT LIMITED TO. ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES
AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE
DEALER FOR SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY. IF SO EXPRESSED IN
WRITING. IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.

7.

In case the vehicle covered by this agreement is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as to
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used vehicle.

8.

In the event that it becomes necessary for Dealer to enforce any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, purchaser
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
^-^

9. This agreement is Non-Transferable.
10.

LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN
THIS AGREEMENT.

11.

PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older.

12.

Title to the vehicle is to remain vested in the Dealer until purchase price is paid in full; purchaser grants to dealer a security
interest in the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full. "** T

13.

No agreement, verbal or otherwise, not contained in this agreement will be recognizedr-

14.

In case the vehicle covered by this agreement is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide)
for this vehicle is part of this contract. I nf ormation on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract sale.

ODOIVC TER DISCLOSURE STAVJVIENT
Federal law (and State law, if applicable) requires that you state the mileage upon transfer
of ownership. Failure to complete or providing a false statement may result in fines and/or
imprisonment.

^ ^ > s£i>

jfar«

_. state that the odometer
(transferors name — PRINT) sxpO*ZL /
.(no tenths) miles
(of the vehicle described below) now reads *rG&<^ /
and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described
below, unless one of the following statements is checked
D (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the
„ s amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits
1&{2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage WARNING —
ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.
1 MAKE

BODY TYRE

~

MODEL

/

^

STOCK NUMBER

VEHICLE ID-NUMBER
TRIM

COLOR

.

TRANSFEROR S PRINTED NAME (SELLER)

TRANSFEROR S STREET ADDRESS

*//&b **1>
f?*^
STATE
S&tJT' £+&£tefat-

CITY

0ATE OF STATEMENT

ZIP CODE

fV/try

TRANSFEBpR S SIGNATURE (SELLER)

PRINTED NAME OF PERSON SIGNING

TRANSFEREES PRINTED NAME (BUYER)

STREET ADDRESS

g j ^ . UjiU- Cll>&£ FT
CITY

S

.

T.

/

STATE .

^

UsY

&\Z4OS$T0A/
RECEIPT OF COPY ACKNOWLEDGED

4* QrTtxtA^ V

TRANSFEREE S SIGNATURE - BUYER

^*ZM*~^\

PRINTED NAME OF PERSON SIGNING

102-3

2IPCODE

<g^73^
DATE

DATE

it.

.-.--"j->-</•' 1\

SSSL*"

MOTORVEHJCLvESOLD^^

MT«OMr,%;ilI,*nn",!pm¥
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^Federal law (and State law. if applicable) requires that you state the mileage upon transfer
of ownership Failure to c4£ft>lete or providing a false statement may result in fines and/or
Imprisonment
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and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described
below, unless one of the following statements is checked
• (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the
amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits
^ ( 2 ) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage WARNING —
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15 USCS § 1987

COMMERCE AND TRADE

RESEARCH GUIDE
Am Jur:
7A Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 185.
Am Jur Proof of Facts:
Fraudulent Alteration of Odometer, 1 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d, p.
677.
Forms:
10 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Highways and Bridges § 38:4.
12 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Fraud and Deceit, Form 40.
Annotations:
Validity, construction, and application of odometer requirement provisions of Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 USCS
§§ 1981-1991). 28 ALR Fed 584.
Law Review Articles:
Consumer Remedies for Odometer Tampering: The Odometer Requirements of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act. 10
Clearinghouse Rev 25, May, 1976.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Although 15 USCS § 1987 requires notice to
be attached to left door frame of vehicle when
odometer is serviced, repaired, or replaced, disclosure requirements as to motorcycle odometers
may be satisfied merely by hanging tag on motorcycle to place potential purchasers on notice
of alteration in mileage registered on odometer,
and statutory provision is not so vague and
uncertain as to be unconstitutional as applied to
motorcycles. Grambo v Loomis Cycle Sales, Inc.
(1975, ND Ind) 404 F Supp 1073.
Defendant's (truck seller's) motion for sum-

mary judgment in his favor as to plaintifTs
(buyer's) claim under 15 USCS § 1987 for alleged odometer alteration without disclosure of
actual mileage"traveled would be denied, because
whether failure to post required notice was done
with intent to defraud was question of fact
which could be established by inference, and
evidence alleged by plaintiff—which must be
assumed to be true on motion for summary
judgment—could have led to inference of intent
to defraud. Lair v Lewis Service Centers, Inc
(1977, DC Neb) 428 F Supp 778.

§ 1988. Disclosure requirements upon transfer of ownership of
motor vehicle
(a) Promulgation of rules. Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 20, 1972], the Secretary shall prescribe
rules requiring any transferor to give the following written disclosure to
the transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of a motor
vehicle:
(1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer.
(2) Disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown, if the odometer
reading is known to the transferor to be different from the number of
miles the vehicle has actually traveled.
Such rules shall prescribe the manner in which information shall be
disclosed under this section and in which such information shall be
retained.
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(b) Violations of rules and giving false statements to transferees prohibited.
No transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section or give a
false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such
rule.
(c) Acceptance of incomplete written disclosure by transferees acquiring
ownership for resale prohibited. No transferee who, for purposes of resale,
acquires ownership of a motor vehicle shall accept any written disclosure
required by any rule prescribed under this section if such disclosure is
incomplete.]
(Oct. 20, 1972, P. L. 92-513, Title IV, §408, 86 Stat. 962; July 14, 1976, P.
L. 94-364, Title IV, § 406, 90 Stat. 983.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Explanatory notes:
Subsec. (c) has been set out in brackets because Act July 14, 1976,
provided for the amendment of subsec. (b) of this section and in
addition set out a subsec. (c), but the Act contained no enacting clause
for subsec. (c).
Effective date of section:
Subsec. (a) of this section effective Oct. 20, 1972, and subsec. (b)
effective "ninety calendar days following" such date; see the note to 15
USCS §1981.
Amendments:
1976. Act July 14, 1976, substituted subsec. (b) for one which read: "It
shall be a violation of this section for any transferor to violate any rules
under this section or to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee
in making any disclosure required by such rules/*; and purportedly
added subsec. (c); see the Explanatory note to this section.
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Rule-making procedures, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR
Part 5.
Rule making procedures of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 49 CFR Part 553.
Odometer disclosure requirements, 49 CFR Part 580.
CROSS REFERENCES
Definitions, 15 USCS §§1901, 1982.
Conspiracy to violate prohibitions, 15 USCS § 1986.
Disclosure requirements regarding repair or replacement of odometer, 15
USCS § 1987.
Civil liability for violations, 15 USCS § 1989.
Injunctions against violations, 15 USCS § 1900.
This section is referred to in 15 USCS § 1986.
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